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Abstract 
One method for uncovering the subprocesses of mental 
processes is the “Additive Factors Method” (AFM). The AFM 
uses reaction time data from factorial experiments to infer the 
presence of separate processing stages. This paper investigates 
the conceptual status of the AFM. It argues that one of the 
AFM’s underlying assumptions is problematic in light of 
recent developments in cognitive neuroscience. Discussion 
begins by laying out the basic logic of the AFM, followed by 
an analysis of the challenge presented by neural reuse. 
Following this, implications are analysed and avenues of 
response considered. Keywords: additive factors method; 
seriality assumption; anatomical modularity; neural reuse. 
 Keywords: additive factors method, neural reuse, stage 
models, seriality assumption 
Introduction 
A good place to start when trying to understand a complex 
process or system is to determine its constitutive parts or 
modules. For example, to figure out how people succeed in 
visual search during reading, the time between stimulus and 
response can be broken down into an encoding, feature 
extraction and identification stage (Resink, 2005; Tovey & 
Herdman, 2014). The decomposition of the time between the 
stimulus and response enables discovery of the underlying 
subprocesses. The stimulus–response time intervals reflect 
the series of processing stages underlying complex 
behaviours.   
One method for uncovering the subprocesses of mental 
processes is the “Additive Factors Method” (henceforth 
AFM) (Townsend & Nozawa 1995; 2001, 2011, 2013; 
Coltheart, 2011). The AFM uses reaction time data from 
factorial experiments to infer the presence of separate 
modules or processing stages. A mental process can be 
broken down into subprocesses when those subprocesses are 
‘separately modifiable’ – that is, when each of the proposed 
modules can be modified without effect to the other, and vice 
versa. For example, to show that two stages A and B are 
separately modifiable it must be shown that two factors, F 
and G, affect only either A or B, but not both. In other words, 
F can affect A and G can affect B, but not the reverse. The 
result of an AFM analysis is what are called ‘stage models’.   
This paper investigates the conceptual status of the AFM. 
It argues that one of the AFM’s main assumptions is 
problematic in light of recent developments in cognitive 
neuroscience. In particular, the argument is that theories of 
neural reuse present a challenge to the conceptual link 
between AFM’s ‘seriality assumption’ and the single 
processor cases it relies on. Discussion begins by laying out 
the basic logic of AFM, followed by an analysis of the 
challenge presented by neural reuse theories. Implications are 
then analysed and avenues of response considered.  
The Additive Factors Method 
Factorial experiments are studies in which the effects of 
two or more variables are investigated by manipulating the 
presence of each factor across various conditions. In its 
simplest version (the complete factorial experiment), two 
factors are studied by comparing the difference each factor 
has on some measure of performance, such as reaction time. 
For example, to evaluate the effect of familiarity on pattern 
recognition, orientation (the rotation of a pattern) can be 
compared to familiarity (whether subjects are better or worse 
at recognising the pattern) (Tovey & Herdman, 2014). If 
orientation has an effect on familiarity, then conditions in 
which stimuli are presented with different orientations, e.g. 
00 vs. 900, will result in delays in the time required to 
recognize a pattern.   
Factorial experiments form the raw data of the AFM. 
Factorial data indicates whether two or more factors have 
either an additive or interaction effect on mean reaction time. 
Leaving interaction effects to one side for the moment, an 
additive effect involves two or more factors selectively 
influencing individual stages of a process. So, for example, if 
stage A normally takes 10ms and stage B normally takes 
15ms and F influences the length of A by 5ms and G 
influences the length of B by 7ms, then the total duration of 
time to complete the process that includes stages A and B will 
be the result of the presence of F and G. The total duration of 
a process is simply the added the sum of each stage as 
influenced by each factor.  
Factorial experiments supply modifiability information by 
revealing the selective influence of some factor(s) (Miller et 
al., 1995). When two or more factors affect the total duration 
of a process (measured using reaction time), the process can 
be separated into different modules or processing stages. 
When patterns of factor effects are observed, a set of 
hypothesized stages and factor relations that underlie the 
pattern are proposed. The effects inferred from the factorial 
experiments are what support inferences about the processing 
stages, justifying the decomposition of a process or stimulus-
response interval into distinct subprocesses.  
The Seriality Assumption 
One key assumption of the AFM is what Sternberg (2001, 
2013) calls the ‘seriality’ assumption. The seriality 
assumption says that the AFM can only be applied to 
processes that are sequentially arranged. For a process to be 
sequentially arranged, one of two situations must hold, either: 
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(i) the process must be data-dependent or (ii) a single 
processor must be responsible for carrying out the process.  
In the first set of cases, seriality depends on information 
being passed along from a previous stage of the process. To 
use a simple example, heading home from grocery shopping 
(stage 2) requires first having collected and bagged the 
groceries at the store (stage 1). In the second set of cases, 
seriality depends on a process being the result of a single 
processor. So, for example, if one bakes with two hands 
multiple steps can be accomplished in parallel, e.g., cracking 
and whisking eggs; while if one bakes with only one hand, 
then the process is limited to being complete one task at a 
time, e.g., cracking each egg individually and then whisking 
them all together.  
How a single process relates to a given processor or set of 
processors can also vary considerably from case to case. For 
example, for even a three stage process, there are several 
types of relations that might hold: (i) a separate processor 
might carry out each process, (ii) the same processor might 
carry out every process, or (iii) there be might some 
combination of the two, where one processor carries out two 
processes and another processor carries out one process. 
Figure 1 provides an illustration.   
 
 
Figure 1. Possible relations between processors and processes for a 
three stage process.  
 
What is interesting is that the seriality assumption 
maintains that in at least a subset of cases specialised 
structures are responsible for carrying out mental processes. 
That it is possible to find one-to-one mappings between 
process modules or stages and processing devices. Sternberg 
(2001), for instance, notes: “Perhaps more surprising is the 
finding of operations that are partially or wholly sequential 
when there is no data-dependence…The basis for the 
sequential structure in such cases may be that the system that 
carries out the set of operations, possibly the same single 
processor, is inherently limited in capacity” (original italics, 
p.735). Not only can processes be sequentially arrange when 
they involve data dependence but they can also be 
sequentially arranged when the realising processor has a 
limited capacity.   
However, notice that this is a claim about neural 
organisation. The single processor view says that neural 
organisation will take a ‘modular’ form in certain cases. That 
in at least some cases mental processes are implemented or 
realised by dedicated pieces of neural hardware. The claim is 
that what makes it possible for a given process to be serially 
arranged is the physical constraints of the realising processor. 
The view is one of a neural organisation wherein a particular 
sequential process is carried out by a chainlike structure of 
connected processing units. To support this claim, for 
example, Sternberg (2001) appeals to cases of highly 
specialised anatomical structures, such as the visual cortex of 
Macaque monkeys. Call this ‘anatomical modularity’.   
Of course, anatomical modularity is usually considered a 
‘functional’ theory, whereas processing stages are periods of 
time. Sternberg (2001), for instance, notes: “A stage theory 
says nothing about the pieces of physical anatomical 
machinery that carry out the operations in the two 
stages…information ‘transmitted from one stage to the next’ 
does not necessarily go from one place to another; the phrase 
is unfortunate because it suggests otherwise (p.732). 
Processor devices that carry out process stages might have 
functional properties, but the processing stages themselves, 
at least as informed by the AFM, are neutral with respect to 
such questions (Kersten, 2016). Nonetheless, there are 
reasons to see the two views as sides of the same coin. This 
is because while the processing stages themselves may not 
have functional properties, they are realised by processors 
that do, i.e. neurological structures. The point here is simply 
that the seriality assumption makes specific a claim about the 
relation between such subprocesses and processors. It does 
not make a claim about what features those subprocesses 
have.   
It will be worth dwelling on this point as it crucial for the 
argument to follow. For one might wonder whether 
‘anatomical modularity’ is not better understood as a claim 
about ‘functional’ organisation or architecture. If so, then the 
AFM would be involved in a form of functional 
decomposition, as it would be set to uncover functional 
architecture rather than neural organisation.  
Crucially, this is not the case. Stage models are set to 
uncover the subprocesses of mental processes, such as those 
involved in visual search, understood as epochs or periods of 
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time. Despite some shared inferential machinery, such as 
factorial experiments, the target and output of the AFM is 
importantly different from those methods aimed at providing 
functional decomposition (see Carruthers, 2006).  
A brief case study will help flesh out the point further. 
Consider Tovey and Herdman’s (2014) investigation of 
visual search during reading. Using the effects of familiarity 
on change perception via a 2 × 5 × 2 factorial design, Tovey 
and Herdman examined the effects of orientation (upright vs. 
inverted, set size (4, 7, 10, 13, 16) and change size (Small vs. 
Large) across four different experiments. In line with Rensink 
(2005), they suggested that change perception was divided 
into three process modules: a pre-processing stage, a feature 
extraction stage, and an identification stage. They proposed 
that an interaction between change size and orientation and 
change size and stimulus quality indicated that change size 
exerted an effect not only on the feature extraction stage but 
also on the identification stage of change perception. Figure 
2 provides an illustration of the model.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Tovey and Herdman’s stage model. Visual search is 
divided into three stages: a pre-processing stage, a feature extraction 
stage, and an identification stage. 
 
To explain the effects of change size, Tovey and Herdman 
proposed a ‘gating’ mechanism. The gating mechanism 
redirects information to different stages of the process via 
detecting changes in size, either by passing the information 
on to the feature-extraction stage for further processing 
(assuming the changes are large) or by retaining and verifying 
the information at the identification stage (assuming the 
changes are small).  The problem is that introduction of a 
gating mechanism complicates interpretation of Tovey and 
Herdman’s model as a stage model. This is because it 
introduces functional properties into the model.   
Notice that Tovey and Herdman place change size outside 
of the processing stages, after feature extraction but before 
identification. This changes the structure of the diagram from 
a flowchart to a circuit diagram. The arrows no longer 
represent a succession in time of a series of processes but 
instead denote the flow of information. The gating 
mechanism is conceived of as the change size, representing 
the redirection of information from one stage to another, not 
only how change size influences time duration.  
However, if processing stages are events in time, they need 
to be strung together end to end, as in a flowchart. If the 
model represented the effect of change size, it would have to 
effect the period of time as represented by the box, not the 
passage or succession of time as represented by the arrows. 
When represented as a circuit diagram – that is, as describing 
how processing devices are connected – stage models 
misleading suggest that the process stages are also processing 
devices; an interpretation, which, as mentioned, fails to 
acknowledge the variety of possible relationships that might 
obtain between process stages and processing devices. 
Sternberg (2001) frames the point nicely: “It is remarkably 
easy to slip into a mode of thinking in which stages are 
processors rather than processes, actors rather than actions; 
confusion about what a stage might be finds its way into 
much writing on the subject, even by experts” (p.828). So 
while Tovey and Herdman’s results may be correct, their 
inclusion of a functional property complicates interpretation 
of the model (Kersten, 2016).  
The ambiguity introduced by the gating mechanism is 
suggestive of the nature of stage models. For if the AFM is to 
uncover the subprocesses (understood as epochs of time) of 
mental processes, then it cannot do so by revealing the 
functional properties of cognitive systems. If it did, this 
would blur the distinction between the AFM and other 
experimental methods. 
To illustrate, consider the method of double-dissociation. 
If two factors F and G are damage to different parts of the 
brain, and one can show using some measure, such as an 
EEG, that factor F influences performance on some task A 
but not task B, while G influences B but not A, then one can 
infer that the F and G perform different functions. The 
separate modifiability of tasks A and B by factors F and G on 
tasks A and B indicate that F and G are have different 
functions.  
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Contrast this with the AFM. Whereas double-dissociation 
uses a direct measure for separate modifiability (the 
differential activity of different brain regions), the AFM only 
indirectly tests for separate modifiability via mean-reaction 
times. It is interested in how a given process can be separated 
or ‘cut’ via finding the selective influence of different factors. 
What this means is that the focus in stage models is on 
temporal rather than functional properties. Thus, one thing 
that cannot be meant by the seriality assumption is that what 
constrains processing stages is functional modularity.   
The general point is that anatomical modularity forms more 
than just a peripheral assumption within the AFM. Indeed, it 
is what helps, in part, justify inferring the presence of serial 
processes. If two processes are not data-dependent and yet 
perform the same function, then it is safe to assume that they 
are realised by the same processor. That anatomical 
modularity should underlie part of the seriality assumption is 
not an insignificant result. The problem is that anatomical 
modularity is increasingly being called into question.  
Neural Reuse and the AFM 
Many of the cognitive functions once thought to have 
dedicated, isolated neural localisations (e.g., Broca’s area) 
are increasingly shown to engage a diverse range of neural 
units. In a recent meta-review, for example, Anderson and 
Pessoa (2011) found that 78 different anatomical regions 
were active in 95 tasks across 9 cognitive domains. Accounts 
of ‘neural reuse’ aim to describe how different brain regions 
often exploit, recycle, or redeploy neural circuitry for various 
cognitive ends (Hurley 2005; Dehaene & Cohen, 2007; 
Dehaene, 2009; Anderson 2007, 2011, 2014).  
A large swath of evidence now favours neural reuse as a 
thesis of neural organisation. To spare a long digression, 
consider a small sampling of some characteristic studies. 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), for instance, show that when 
asked to make sense judgments about different sentences 
participants take longer on sentences that run counter to the 
required action than those that do not. Richardson et al. 
(2003) show that certain sets of verbs, such as ‘hope’ and 
‘respect’, activate meaning-specific spatial schemas. 
Pulvermuller (2005) demonstrates that listening to action 
words, such as ‘lick’ or ‘pick’, activate regions of the primary 
motor cortex, areas often associated with the actions 
themselves. Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) show that 
people are often unable to ignore irrelevant spatial 
information when making judgments about duration, but not 
the converse. That mental representations of time are 
intimately tied up with perceptions of space. Finally, 
Casasanto and Dijkstra (2010) demonstrate that there is a 
bidirectional influence between motor control and 
autobiographical memory. 
Neural reuse theories raise a number of interesting 
questions about cognition, such as whether a new ‘cognitive 
ontology’ needs to be developed (Anderson, 2014). However, 
for present purposes, the point to note is that neural reuse also 
raises questions for the second set of cases appealed to by the 
seriality assumption: namely, that some processes are 
sequentially arranged in virtue of being realised by single 
processors. The issue is that if neural reuse is true, then it is 
unlikely that there will be any single process that has a unique 
anatomical structure or processor supporting it. Finding a 
one-to-one mappings between processor and process will 
prove particularly troublesome if neural regions support 
multiple operations.  
 
Figure 3.Two possibilities of neural organisation for two cognitive 
operations.   
 
There seem to be two options. 1.1a represents a modular 
design, where each cognitive operation has specific dedicated 
neural circuitry. This is what is required by the second half of 
the seriality assumption. 1.1b, on the other hand, represents a 
neural reuse design, where each cognitive process is shared 
among a number of neural circuits. The AFM requires that 
1.1a hold for at least a subset of cases. However, if, as noted, 
neural reuse is true, then whatever else might be right about 
the AFM, the single processor cases might not exist. Neural 
reuse seems to challenge the link between the seriality 
assumption and one of its inferential bases.  
It is important to be clear about this point. For it might be 
still maintained that the AFM uncovers something about 
functional organisation. That it would not matter if the same 
neural hardware were involved in multiple operations 
because once those operations were fixed the AFM would be 
set to uncover functional organisation.  
But again, once it is appreciated that the target and output 
of the AFM is not functional models but models of temporal 
stages it follows that the underlying assumption about 
processors has to be about neural organisation. For although 
it is right to point out that neural architecture can stand in 
complex relations to functional architecture, such as 
distributed neural regions supporting a functionally modular 
architecture, such considerations cannot do much work here. 
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This is because they threaten to undermine the AFM’s 
conceptual standing. If AFM did reveal insights into 
functional architecture, then its distinctiveness would be 
undercut, for it would no longer reveal insights into the 
organisation of cognitive subprocesses understood as 
temporal sequences.  
Another tack would be try to accept the incompatibility of 
anatomical modularity and neural reuse but nonetheless 
reject neural reuse on the basis of the wider importance of the 
AFM. One might argue, in other words, something along the 
following lines: (1) AFM is essential to psychology; (2) AFM 
is incompatible with neural reuse; therefore, (3) neural reuse 
is false.  
But there are at least two problems with this type of 
argument. One is that it assumes that cognitive psychology 
can operate independently of cognitive neuroscience. That 
the conceptual autonomy of psychology ensures the survival 
of the AFM. However, the increasing integration of 
neurological data into cognitive theorising and modelling 
makes it unlikely that cognitive psychology will continue to 
function independently of the findings of cognitive 
neuroscience in this way (Forstmann et al. 2011; de 
Hollander et al., 2016). The other is that the argument 
problematically assumes that the choice facing the proponent 
of AFM is either/or: that either neural reuse has to be rejected 
or the AFM does. But no such dichotomy is required. As is 
argued later, it is possible to endorse a version of the AFM 
that drops anatomical modularity but which still nonetheless 
operates in other sets of cases. 
Three Options for the AFM 
It seems fair to say, then, that neural reuse casts some doubt 
on the inferential bases of one of the key assumption of the 
AFM. Given this, three options seem available to the 
proponent of the AFM. One is to drop the seriality 
assumption altogether. One might maintain that the AFM can 
continue on without the seriality assumption. This option 
seems undesirable insofar as the seriality assumption is part 
and parcel of the AFM logic. Separate modifiability only 
makes sense when the processes being investigated are 
sequentially arranged. Dropping seriality would be 
tantamount to dropping the method altogether; and scuttling 
the method altogether seems undesirable given the good deal 
of fruitful research that has been carried out using the AFM 
(e.g., Resink, 2005; Tovey & Herdman, 2014).  
A second option would be to reform the seriality 
assumption in light of neural reuse. One might claim, for 
instance, that serial processes can be the product of 
distributed neural processors. The problem with this option is 
that it undermines the inferential link between processor and 
processing stages. Anatomical modularity forms a key 
assumption within the AFM. Without it, the AFM would lose 
its ability to infer a serial ordering. Return, for example, to 
the baking case, it is only because there is one single 
processor that the stages are arranged serially. The addition 
of a second hand opens up the task to being achieved in 
multiple stages, i.e. in parallel. If multiple processors are 
admitted, then inferences to processing stages are 
underdetermined.   
But, one might object, it could be that a bunch of miniature 
‘hands’ accomplish the baking task. In other words, that a 
distributed network of miniature processors performs the task 
serially, whose actual decomposition is discoverable (at least 
in part) by the AFM. The problem with this rejoinder is that 
again misses the key point of stage models, and to lesser 
extent the baking example. For while it is true that adding 
more processors speeds up the process, it also makes it 
impossible to interpret the process as serially ordered. For 
example, switching to using two hands during the baking (i.e. 
allowing multiple processors) opens the process up to being 
completed in parallel. There is nothing that forces the process 
into being completed in successive stages. Thus, in assuming 
that a process is realised by distributed set of processors one 
undermines the ability to interpret that process as serial in the 
first place. The grounds for inferring seriality rests on the 
process being carried out by a single processor.   
Finally, one might jettison the seriality assumption’s 
commitment to the single processor view, i.e. anatomical 
modularity. This might preserve what is right about the AFM 
(i.e. inferring seriality on the basis of data-dependence), 
while dropping the theoretically suspect part (i.e. reliance on 
single processor cases). The idea would be to restrict the set 
of cases under which seriality could be legitimately inferred. 
That is, whereas previously cases of single processors and 
data-dependence cases could be used, now only data-
dependent cases would be allowed to infer seriality.   
For example, a study such as Tovey and Herdman’s would 
not be affected according to the third proposal, because visual 
search during reading is a data-dependent process. The 
serially ordering is dependent on each of the previous stages 
being completed before the next one begins; one cannot, for 
instance, detect the presence of certain letters before those 
letters have been registered by the visual system. Tovey and 
Herdman’s study does not rely on the single process cases to 
work, so it can still be used to infer separate modifiability. 
However, cases where seriality is inferred because of the 
supposed presence of a single processor, such as Scarbourgh 
and Landauer’s (1981) study on word repetition effects, 
would have to be dropped according to this proposal. So, 
although the removal of anatomical modularity might involve 
the loss of some of the AFM’s methodological punch, as not 
an insubstantial number of cases involve the assumption 
(Sternberg, 2001, p.831-2), the method itself would still be 
preserved in an attenuated form.   
Given the spread options, the third proposal seems the most 
preferable going forward. The first and third options suggest 
either too high a methodological price or an endorsement of 
a conceptual tension. Only option three seems to allow the 
AFM to continue on, though in slightly modified form. On 
the third proposal, serial stage models can be inferred, but 
only on the basis of data-dependent cases. The single 
processor cases underlying the seriality assumption need to 
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be bracketed, at least until such a time that neural reuse can 
be thoroughly vetted. This might be a welcomed result for 
some (Stanford & Gurney, 2011; Sternberg, 2013), but 
maybe not so much for others (Coltheart, 2011).  
So, to summarize, though not a devastating blow, neural 
reuse does represent a serious challenge to some aspects of 
the AFM. Insofar as neural reuse presents a challenge to 
anatomical modularity, and anatomical modularity falls out 
of the seriality assumption, some of the AFM’s conceptual 
foundations need to be reworked. The methodological 
implications still need to be worked out, but the conceptual 
moral seems relatively clear: the seriality assumption can no 
longer rely on single processor cases. Hopefully, then, in 
having identified the problem and charted some potential 
responses, the AFM can be put on surer theoretical footing 
going forward.   
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